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The future of personal transportation may be in vehicles that drive 
themselves, requiring little—or no—human input. Several manufactur-
ers1 are currently developing these vehicles, referred to as “autonomous 
vehicles.”2 One company, Google, has already been actively testing au-
tonomous vehicles on public roadways,3 and several states have recently 
passed laws authorizing the use of such vehicles on public highways.4 
The day that we all have a personal, robotic chauffeur may not be too far 
away. 
Autonomous vehicles could, potentially, alleviate many problems 
with our current transportation model. The vehicles could deal with traf-
fic more efficiently, reduce the vehicle’s carbon emissions by ensuring 
the car is always operating at maximum efficiency, increase safety 
through better accident-avoidance mechanisms, and increase worker 
productivity by freeing the driver to multitask during a commute.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* J.D. Candididate, Seattle University School of Law, 2013. 
 1. See Mark Hachman, Volkswagen Develops Self-Driving Car, Almost, PCMAG.COM (June 23, 
2011, 10:16 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2387524,00.asp#fbid=cbDEXQGVzSY 
(Volkswagen); Ben Wojdyla, Ford Developing System To Tell Future, Predict Crashes Before They 
Happen, JALOPNIK (Oct. 9, 2009, 2:45 PM), http://jalopnik.com/5377690/ford-developing-system-
to-tell-future-predict-crashes-before-they-happen (Ford); Chuck Squatriglia, GM Says Driverless 
Cars Could Be on the Road by 2018, WIRED.COM AUTOPIA, (Jan. 7, 2008, 1:49 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2008/01/gm-says-driverl (General Motors). 
 2. See, e.g., Delen Goldberg, Self-Driving Robot Cars About to Hit Nevada Highways, LAS 
VEGAS SUN (June 26, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/jun/26/self-driving-
robot-cars-about-hit-nevada-highways. 
 3. Sebastian Thrun, What We’re Driving at, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG, (Oct. 9, 2010, 12:00 
PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/what-were-driving-at.html. Google claims it has driv-
en the vehicles more than 140,000 miles on public roads without incident and with minimal driver 
interaction. Id. 
 4. 2011 CA S.B. No. 1298 (NS) (California); F.S.A. § 316.86 (Florida); N.R.S. 482A.100 
(Nevada). 
 5. Thrun, supra note 3. 
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But the emergence of autonomous vehicles presents many legal 
questions. Particularly, how should liability, absent statutory or regulato-
ry directive, be assessed and apportioned when an autonomous vehicle, 
under automatic control, gets into an accident that is not clearly the fault 
of another vehicle? How the law treats autonomous vehicle liability, 
while attempting to preserve as many of the benefits as possible, could 
have substantial effects on the development and safety of the technology, 
and the subsequent future of transportation.6 Obviously the statutory and 
regulatory treatment of autonomous vehicles will play a large role in 
shaping the future of this technology. But courts, too, will play a pivotal 
role in shaping the legal treatment of autonomous vehicles by answering 
questions not addressed (or addressed poorly) by legislation and regula-
tion. Accordingly, this Comment offers courts guidance on approaching 
the question of liability arising from an accident involving an autono-
mous vehicle. 
Courts will inevitably struggle to adapt existing liability laws to this 
new technology. This Comment outlines some of the legal issues pre-
sented by autonomous vehicles, and then focuses on how a court could 
proceed when presented with a question of liability for an accident in-
volving an autonomous vehicle. Part II discusses the history of autono-
mous vehicles and the current legal landscape with respect to autono-
mous vehicles. Part III assesses analogies to similar previously automat-
ed technologies to determine what principles can be drawn from the legal 
reaction to those technologies, and assesses those principles for their ap-
plicability to autonomous vehicles. Finally, Part IV encourages courts to 
conclude that autonomous vehicle manufacturers, similar to common 
carriers of passengers, owe the public the highest duty of care, liable for 
even the slightest negligence. Two rationales support this conclusion: 
first, autonomous vehicles are similar to common carriers of passengers 
in most important facets; second, the policy justifications for holding 
common carriers to the highest standard of care are similarly applicable 
to autonomous vehicle manufacturers. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Autonomous vehicle technology dates as far back as the 1939 
World’s Fair in New York.7 Development of fully autonomous vehicles, 
however, did not occur until the early part of the twenty-first century. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 6. See Squatriglia, supra note 1 (suggesting that bureaucratic hurdles, such as government 
regulation and liability laws, create a larger barrier to autonomous vehicles than do technical chal-
lenges). 
 7. Randal O’Toole, GRIDLOCK: WHY WE’RE STUCK IN TRAFFIC AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
189–92 (2009). 
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2004, 2005, and 2007, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
held a series of challenges, inviting researchers at universities and corpo-
rations to compete for a cash prize by developing vehicles capable of 
performing complex maneuvers such as merging, passing, parking, and 
negotiating intersections without any human control or remote input.8 
The vehicles competing in these competitions, and other autonomous 
vehicles tested at the time, were mostly developed in university research 
labs.9 Increasingly, however, car companies are developing technologies 
that can take control of the car from the driver in emergencies,10 or even 
drive the car completely.11 
In 2010, Google announced that it had developed several autono-
mous vehicles, based on Toyota’s Prius, which were capable of navi-
gating public roads, including interacting with traffic, entirely without 
human input.12 Further, Google stated that the cars had already driven 
over 140,000 miles on California roads without incident and with only 
occasional human control.13 But on August 5, 2011, one of Google’s au-
tonomous vehicles rear-ended another car.14 Although Google immedi-
ately announced that the accident occurred while the car was being oper-
ated manually, and not in automatic mode, the accident caused some to 
question the legality of autonomous vehicle use on public roads.15 
Nothing in California law prevented Google from testing the cars,16 
and an official from the California Department of Motor Vehicles at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 8. DARPA URBAN CHALLENGE, http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge/index.asp (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2012). 
 9. Kristen Grieshaber, Free University Driverless Car Navigates Berlin Streets, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 20, 2011, 10:44 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/20/free-university-
driverless-car_n_971675.html. See also Tyler Brown, The Car that Drives Itself, STANFORD DAILY 
(Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.stanforddaily.com/2010/04/12/the-car-that-drives-itself. 
 10. Wojdyla, supra note 1. 
 11. Hachman, supra note 1. In fact, we already drive vehicles with numerous “autonomous” 
systems. Consider: “‘I don’t think cars will become autonomous instantly,’ [Michael] Montemerlo 
said, pointing to ‘smart’ anti-lock brakes that are already in cars. ‘You should think of that car as 
being just a tiny bit autonomous. Cars are going to have more and more of these adaptive systems 
and one day you’ll wake up, and you’ll have a car that’s able to drive itself.’” Rahul Kanakia, Robot 
Car to Tackle City Streets—Stanford Racing Team Has Big Plans for 2007 Grand Challenge, 
STANFORD DAILY ONLINE (Oct. 11, 2006). 
 12. Thrun, supra note 3. 
 13. John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1314590761-
rC39CHKoUVybCEEcEQB6GQ. 
 14. Justin Hyde, This Is Google’s First Self-Driving Car Crash, JALOPNIK (Aug. 5, 2011, 
11:45 AM), http://jalopnik.com/5828101/this-is-googles-first-self+driving-car-crash. 
 15. Chris Matyszczyk, Google’s Self-Driving Wreck: Really Human Error?, CNET NEWS 
(Aug. 5, 2011, 1:19 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-20088751-71/googles-self-driving-
wreck-really-human-error. 
 16. See Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 34500–34520.5 (2005) (providing safety regulations for motor 
vehicles in California). 
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time of Google’s announcement commented that any accidents would be 
treated similarly to cruise control, with the driver being held liable for 
any accident as if she were in full control of the car.17 In the subsequent 
years, several states have passed statutes legalizing the use of autono-
mous vehicles on public roads.18 
Nevada, reportedly in partial response to significant lobbying by 
Google,19 became the first state in the nation to expressly legalize the 
operation of autonomous vehicles on public roads.20 The law tasks the 
Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles with developing safety and liabil-
ity regulations governing the use of autonomous vehicles on public roads 
and highways.21 California and Florida have passed similar laws.22 Other 
states have since considered bills authorizing the use of autonomous ve-
hicles, with Arizona, Hawaii, and Oklahoma currently considering such 
laws.23 Additionally, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion is planning a one-year pilot program to test autonomous vehicles’ 
ability to prevent accidents.24 
As the technology becomes closer to widespread implementation, 
however, questions surrounding the law’s treatment of autonomous vehi-
cles become more pressing. For example, autonomous vehicles will like-
ly rely on map databases for determining the best route to a destination. 
Electronic map databases, like those used by now-ubiquitous in-car navi-
gation devices, can have outdated or erroneous information.25 While lia-
bility is not a concern when a driver is following the directions of a navi-
gation aid, is the same true if an accident caused by an erroneous data-
base were to occur without any human interaction? Google’s vehicles 
purportedly have laser range-finders to “see” other traffic,26 but will the-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 17. Justin Hyde, Are Google’s Driverless Cars Legal?, JALOPNIK (Oct. 11, 2010, 4:00 PM), 
http://jalopnik.com/5661240/are-googles-driverless-cars-legal. 
 18. See supra, note 4. 
 19. John Markoff, Google Lobbies Nevada to Allow Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/science/11drive.html?_r=2&emc=eta1; Goldberg, 
supra note 2. 
 20. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.030–482A.200 (2011). 
 21. Id. See also Goldberg, supra note 2. 
 22. CAL.VEH. CODE § 38750 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 316.86 (2012). 
 23. H.R. 2679, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012); H.R. 3007, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla 
2012) (proposed legislation in Oklahoma); 2011 HI H.C.R. 212-12 (NS), Mar. 14, 2012 (proposed 
legislation in Hawaii). See also Alisa Priddle, Self-Driving Cars Get Closer Every Day, but Won’t 
Hit You, USA TODAY, (Mar. 24, 2012, 2:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/autos/story/ 
2012-03-25/self-driving-car/53734450/1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Krissy Clark, The GPS: A Fatally Misleading Travel Companion, NPR.ORG (July 26, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/26/137646147/the-gps-a-fatally-misleading-travel-companion. 
 26. Thrun, supra note 3. 
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se cars be able to detect turn signals or unexpected events (such as a 
child running into the road)?27 
The answers to these questions, and countless others, will only be-
come more relevant as implementation of the technology approaches. 
This Comment next assesses the legal treatment of a few analogous tech-
nologies to determine whether the law’s treatment of those technologies 
could inform our discussion of autonomous vehicles. It then attempts to 
answer the basic question of how a court could approach the issue of lia-
bility in an autonomous vehicle accident. 
III. ANALOGIES TO PREVIOUS AUTOMATED TECHNOLOGIES 
Scholars have attempted to draw analogies between autonomous 
vehicles and other automated technologies, but have found these analo-
gies to be lacking.28 For instance, the obvious analogy, to autopilots in 
ships and airplanes, proves inadequate because courts in those settings 
require constant human oversight, an undesirable result in the case of 
autonomous vehicles.29 On the other hand, a less expected analogy, to 
automated elevators, may provide some interesting insights to the way 
the law has adapted to automated technologies. We look at these two 
analogous technologies separately. 
A. Airplane and Ship Autopilots 
A natural analogy to autonomous vehicles is autopilots used in air-
planes and ships. Both types of technologies involve turning over control 
of a method of transportation to a combination of software and hard-
ware.30 Unfortunately for our purposes, most litigation over liability aris-
ing from an accident involving an autopilot has determined that human 
error by the operators, not malfunctioning of the autopilots, was the 
cause of the accident.31 In the contexts of airplanes and ships, constant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 27. Goldberg, supra note 2. 
 28. K. Krasnow Waterman & Matthew T. Henshon, Imagine the Ram-if-ications: Assessing 
Liability for Robotics-Based Car Accidents, ABA SCITECH LAW, vol. 5, no. 4, 2009, at 14. 
 29. A further discussion of why a duty of constant oversight would be undesirable in the con-
text of autonomous vehicles can be found in Part IV(B), infra. 
 30. See, generally ROBERT NELSON, FLIGHT STABILITY AND AUTOMATIC CONTROL (2d ed. 
1998); Now—The Automatic Pilot, POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY, February, 1930, at 22. 
 31. See, e.g., In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(Affirming a finding of “willful misconduct” on behalf of pilots who were unaware that the autopilot 
had caused an airplane to divert 360 miles into restricted USSR air space, and ultimately finding that 
human error, not the autopilot, was responsible for the diversion); see also Marine Report: Heeling 
Accident on M/V Crown Princess, NTSB/MAR-08/01 (Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd. Jan. 30, 2008), 
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2008/MAR0801.pdf (detailing a National Transpor-
tation Safety Board critique of the captain of a cruise ship for engaging the ship’s autopilot too early 
after leaving port, and a second officer’s steering responses, leading to an accident that injured more 
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oversight is both implied and expected, thus reducing the role of the au-
tonomous technology.32 On the other hand, in autonomous vehicles, re-
ducing or eliminating the duty of constant oversight may be necessary to 
effectuate many benefits of the technology. For example, the possibility 
of increased productivity during commutes would be reduced or elimi-
nated if drivers of autonomous vehicles, like ship captains or airplane 
pilots, were required to maintain constant oversight of the vehicle while 
in “automatic” mode.33 
Further, autopilots on ships and airplanes are limited to devices de-
signed to maintain a singular course or direction by passively reacting to 
variations in limited, discrete outside conditions (like wind or current).34 
Autonomous vehicles, on the other hand, will be required to interact with 
complex, evolving environments (e.g., traffic, unexpected events), and to 
make affirmative choices so as to safely arrive at the destination (e.g. 
what lane to be in, what exit to take). Thus, because autonomous vehicle 
technology may be most valuable given some reduced level of oversight, 
and because the technology involves substantially different expectations 
regarding expectations and capabilities, an analogy to ship and airplane 
autopilots is unenlightening. These critical differences between autono-
mous vehicles and automatic pilots in ships and airplanes make it diffi-
cult to draw any strong conclusions as to how the law should deal with 
autonomous vehicles. 
Nevertheless, there is one case involving an airplane autopilot that 
may inform our discussion of autonomous vehicles. In Beverly Richard-
son v. Bombardier,35 a plaintiff asserted that the a crash of a C-23B, a 
military transport aircraft, while under autopilot was the result of a defec-
tive autopilot.36 But in denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, the 
court revealed that the evidence showed that the airplane was misbal-
anced—either as a result of mis-loading or design—which rendered the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
than 300 passengers). For a further discussion of airplane autopilots and liability, see Krasnow & 
Henshon, supra note 28. 
 32. Krasnow & Henshon, supra note 28. 
 33. The argument that a driver of an autonomous vehicle should have a reduced or eliminated 
oversight duty is more thoroughly discussed in Part IV(B), infra. 
 34. See Lawrence Sperry: Autopilot Innovator and Aviation Innovator, HISTORYNET.COM, 
(June 12, 2006), http://www.historynet.com/lawrence-sperry-autopilot-inventor-and-aviation-
innovator.htm (describing the history and development of the airplane automatic pilot). While air-
plane automatic pilots are obviously inordinately complex, they are designed to deal fundamentally 
with three variables (yaw, pitch, and roll). Id. Alternatively, automated vehicles will have to be able 
to react to an infinite amount of external variables (other vehicles, for example). 
 35. Richardson v. Bombardier, Inc., No. 8:03CV544T31MSS, 2005 WL 3087864 (M.D. Fla. 
Nov. 16, 2005). 
 36. Id. at *6. 
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autopilot incapable of recovering from a dive.37 A similar approach, fo-
cusing on the design of vehicles themselves, could be used with autono-
mous vehicles, and this approach is discussed more thoroughly below. 
B. Automation of Elevators 
Elevators, once manually operated, made a gradual shift to auto-
matic operation in the first half of the twentieth century. This shift was 
accompanied by two significant changes that encouraged the widespread 
adoption of automatic elevator technology: innovative insurance poli-
cies38 and increased state regulation.39 For example, almost every state 
has passed regulation specifying requirements for elevator construction 
and maintenance.40 Instead of adopting their own standards, almost every 
state has adopted industry-proposed safety standards.41 While the transi-
tion from manual to automatic elevators may not be completely analo-
gous to the evolution of autonomous vehicles, the adoption of industry 
safety standards may be instructive as a potential avenue for developing 
initial regulatory schemes. Currently, the Industrial Truck Standards De-
velopment Foundation has published suggested safety standards for un-
manned automated industrial vehicles, as well as for the automated func-
tions of manned industrial vehicles.42 While these standards are not di-
rectly applicable to autonomous vehicles on public roads, they may pro-
vide a template for developing safety standards for autonomous vehicle 
legislation and regulation.43 
Additionally, along with the widespread adoption of elevators, in-
surance companies created special “elevator liability” insurance.44 Simi-
larly, innovative insurance policies may be developed to deal with the 
legal questions presented by autonomous vehicles. 
However, another legal reaction to elevators (automated or not) was 
to consider the elevator as a common carrier, and thus hold their opera-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 37. Id. at *14. 
 38. See, e.g., James A. Robertson, How Umbrella Policies Started Part 2: The First Umbrella 
Forms, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., INC. (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.irmi.com/Expert/Artic 
les/2000/Robertson04.aspx. 
 39. Krasnow & Henshon, supra note 28. 
 40. See Elevator Safety Regulations, 0060 REGSURVEYS 7 (2012). 
 41. Krasnow & Henshon, supra note 28. 
 42. INDUS. TRUCK STANDARDS DEV. FOUND., SAFETY STANDARD FOR GUIDED INDUSTRIAL 
VEHICLES AND AUTOMATED FUNCTIONS OF MANNED INDUSTRIAL VEHICLES (Nov. 1, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.egeminusa.com/pdf/ITSDF_B56-5-2005-rev-2-28-06.pdf. 
 43. The content of such standards is beyond the scope of this Comment. Similarly, we do not 
address the question of whether regulation, legislation, or some combination would be the most 
appropriate method for ensuring autonomous vehicle safety. 
 44. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 37. 
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tors and manufacturers to a higher duty of care.45 Initially, courts strug-
gled with the question of whether an elevator was a common carrier.46 
Some courts held that elevator owners were only required to use reason-
able and ordinary care (because elevator operators did not charge a fee 
for their use and an alternative mode of transportation—stairs—was 
available),47 while other courts held that elevator owners owed the high-
est level of care to passengers because “such responsibility attaches to all 
persons engaged in employments where human beings submit their bod-
ies to their [sic] control by which their lives or limbs are put in hazard.”48 
Eventually, courts reached a consensus: elevators are common carriers of 
passengers,49 and thus their operators and manufacturers are held to the 
highest duty of care. 
This Comment next addresses the reasons why autonomous vehi-
cles are analogous to common carriers. It then analyzes how the resulting 
heightened duty of care would apply to autonomous vehicle manufactur-
ers. 
IV. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AS COMMON CARRIERS 
The law treats common carriers differently than other entities, hold-
ing that a common carrier owes the highest duty of care to its passen-
gers.50 Autonomous vehicles will share many characteristics with com-
mon carriers: they will engage in transportation services, their services 
will be widely available to the public, and the passenger’s safety is not 
entirely within the control of the passenger. This Comment argues that 
courts should hold autonomous vehicle manufacturers to the same stand-
ard as common carriers—they should owe passengers the highest duty of 
care. For this analogy to stand, however, we must discuss the scope and 
limitations of this Comment as well as several necessary assumptions. 
A. Scope: What About Product Liability? 
Although manufacturers are generally held strictly liable for defec-
tive products, courts treat liability for defectively designed products dif-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 45. See, e.g., Willoughby v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 87 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 46. Compare Case Comment, An Elevator Not a Common Carrier, 10 YALE L. J. 287 (1901) 
(discussing several decisions in which New York courts had rejected the argument that elevators 
were common carriers), with Case Comment, Carriers—Liability of Elevator Operator, 4 TEX. L. 
REV. 247 (1926) (concluding that a majority of jurisdictions consider elevators as common carriers). 
 47. See An Elevator Not a Common Carrier, supra note 46. 
 48. Id. at 288–89. 
 49. See, e.g., Willoughby, 87 S.W.3d at 511–12. 
 50. “Common carriers of passengers are those that undertake to carry all persons indifferently 
who may apply for passage, so long as there is room, and there is no legal excuse for refusal.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 269 (4th ed. 1968). 
2013] Autonomous Vehicle Liability 13 
ferently from products that are defectively manufactured. Exploring the 
distinction between a “design defect” and a “manufacturing defect” is 
necessary to determine how a court would deal with an autonomous ve-
hicle alleged to have been defectively designed. 
Generally, product manufacturers are held strictly liable for defec-
tively manufactured products.51 The strict liability standard articulated in 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, and first adopted by 
California in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 52  is instructive to 
courts when determining liability stemming from manufacturing de-
fects.53 A product with a manufacturing defect is a product manufactured 
with some unintended flaw.54 In autonomous vehicles, courts could treat 
a manufacturing defect like any other product: the manufacturer would 
be strictly liable for any damage caused by a vehicle that was delivered 
to the consumer in a defective condition.55 For example, if the autono-
mous vehicle was designed to have four cameras to monitor surrounding 
traffic, but the vehicle was—through accident or otherwise—
manufactured with only three, that manufacturer would be liable for any 
harm stemming from the lack of the fourth camera, regardless of whether 
its exclusion was negligent.56 
Design defects, however, are less simple. Design defects are inher-
ent in the design of the product, and are intended.57 Section 402A was 
not written with design defects in mind,58 and courts have struggled with 
defining what constitutes defective design.59 For strict liability to attach 
to a product, the plaintiff must prove that the product was in a defective 
condition and was unreasonably dangerous at the time of its sale by the 
defendant.60 Therefore, to prove that a manufacturer is strictly liable for a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 52. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
 53. Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 
WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1232–1233 (1993). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 56. For a thorough discussion of how products liability law, as it stands today, would deal with 
autonomous vehicles, and an argument that the law need not adopt changes to product liability to 
deal with autonomous vehicles, see Note, Andrew P. Garza, “Look Ma, No Hands!”: Wrinkles and 
Wrecks in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 581 (2012). 
 57. Davis, supra note 53. 
 58. For a thorough history of the American Law Institute proceedings that form the backdrop 
to section 402A, see George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2301 (1989) (arguing that Section 402A was intended to only reach “mismanufactured” prod-
ucts); and John E. Montgomery and David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration 
of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803 (1976). 
 59. See 3 Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, LAW OF TORTS, § 12.2 at 107 
(2d ed. 1986); John W. Wade, On Product “Design Defects” and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. 
REV. 551, 566–69 (1980). 
 60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
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product that caused some harm (absent a manufacturing defect), a plain-
tiff must prove that the design itself is defective.61 
In defining what constitutes a defective condition that is unreasona-
bly dangerous, courts and commentators have adopted a variety of tests 
that introduce negligence-like balancing factors to a strict liability analy-
sis.62 These factors include an evaluation of the product’s overall useful-
ness (to both society and the individual user), an evaluation of the prod-
uct’s overall safety, and a determination of the viability of products or 
features alternative to the offending one at issue.63 Thus, while courts 
still state that they are applying a “strict liability” standard, they are often 
weighing the utility of the product, the severity of the harm caused, and 
the burden on the manufacturer of an alternative design. The result is that 
many courts, when assessing an allegedly defective design, are—instead 
of simply applying strict liability—actually performing a similar analysis 
to that set forth as a test for negligence by Judge Learned Hand in United 
States v. Carroll Towing64—weighing the possibility and gravity of po-
tential harm against the burden on the manufacturer of avoiding such 
harm.65 
Regardless of the test for determining what constitutes a design de-
fect, questions remain regarding the responsibility of a manufacturer for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 61. Id. 
 62. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 836–
38 (1973). Wade proposed seven factors for courts to consider when evaluating defective design 
claims. They are as follows: 
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product—its utility to the user and to the public 
as a whole. 
(2) The safety aspects of the product—the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the 
probable seriousness of the injury. 
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as 
unsafe. 
(4) The manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without 
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility. 
(5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product. 
(6) The user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their 
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the prod-
uct, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions. 
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the 
price of the product or carrying liability insurance. 
Id. For examples of courts applying these and similar factors, see Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 
363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Voss v. 
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 
1033 (Ore. 1974); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). 
 63. Davis, supra note 53. 
 64. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 65. Davis, supra note 53. 
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advances in technology during and after the time of manufacturing.66 The 
challenges will be particularly difficult with new technologies, like au-
tonomous vehicles, where no similar products can provide a direct com-
parison. 
The primary legal questions regarding autonomous vehicles, there-
fore, will likely converge around what constitutes a safe design. Alt-
hough a wide variety of scenarios may lead to litigation, the question of 
whether the vehicle was defectively designed could be raised in any ac-
cident where (1) the vehicle is in automatic mode; (2) there is no manu-
facturing defect; and (3) liability is disputed or fault does not lie entirely 
with another driver. Especially in the early stages, defining what consti-
tutes a safe design for autonomous vehicles will be challenging.67 After 
addressing the limitations and assumptions of this Comment, we will 
then argue that courts should hold manufacturers of autonomous vehicles 
to the highest duty of care, liable for even the slightest negligence in the 
design of autonomous vehicles. 
B. Assumptions 
As described below, we make three assumptions for purposes of 
this Comment. 
Reduced Driver’s Duty. We assume a reduction of the duty of care 
owed by the driver, either by statute, regulation, or common law. An ex-
ample of a reduced duty of care for drivers is the Nevada bill, which pro-
vides an exception to the state’s prohibition on cell phone use while driv-
ing.68 The exception states that, for the purposes of the cell phone use 
prohibition, “a person shall be deemed not to be operating a motor vehi-
cle if the motor vehicle is driven autonomously through the use of artifi-
cial-intelligence software and the autonomous operation of the motor 
vehicle is authorized by law.”69 Although similar provisions may not be 
included in all laws authorizing the use of autonomous vehicles on public 
roads, we make the assumption of a reduced duty for drivers for several 
reasons. 
First, reducing the duty of care the driver owes to passengers and 
other drivers would be required to realize many of the potential benefits 
of autonomous vehicle technology. For example, the purported benefit of 
allowing commuters the ability to multi-task while commuting (e.g., an-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 66. See John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to 
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734 (1983). 
 67. For example, what type of equipment must be included for the vehicle to be deemed safely 
constructed? 
 68. NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.165 (2011); see also Markoff, supra note 13 
 69. NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.165 (2011). 
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swering email) and the resultant increase in efficiency and productivity70 
would be lost were the driver held to the same standard as if she were in 
manual control of the vehicle—the driver would have to maintain con-
stant vigilance, as if she were manually driving. Another potential benefit 
of autonomous vehicles is the possibility of limiting the instances of 
drunk driving. However, the benefit of allowing drunk drivers to have 
their car drive them home would be lost if the driver’s duty was not re-
duced, in which case the driver may be incentivized to intervene in an 
emergency or potentially be held liable for an accident caused while the 
vehicle was in automatic mode. Finally, autonomous vehicles could offer 
unprecedented opportunities to people with disabilities—especially those 
with physical limitations like blindness that prevent them from driving—
opportunities that would be foreclosed if the driver were required by law 
to maintain oversight of the vehicle while in automatic operation.71 
Second, driver intervention while a vehicle is in automatic mode 
may not be desirable. Even if a driver of an autonomous vehicle is not 
authorized by law to engage in activities otherwise illegal for a driver 
(texting, for instance, is allowed for a driver of an autonomous vehicle 
under Nevada’s law),72 a driver is unlikely to maintain the same level of 
attention as if he were driving manually. A driver intervening to avoid an 
accident will likely not have closely monitored blind spots, for example, 
and intervening in an impending emergency may lead to a less-safe reac-
tion. A similar, and instructive, situation occurred in the fatal crash of 
Air France Flight 447. Icing of air speed sensors caused the autopilot to 
disengage, and when the pilot took over manual control, his incomplete 
understanding of the situation caused him to react in a manner that exac-
erbated the problem, ultimately leading to the plane’s crash.73 To be 
clear, the pilot’s lack of understanding about the causes of the situation 
led directly to the crash.74 Similarly, a driver of an autonomous vehicle 
who intervenes during an accident may not have the same situational 
awareness as if she were manually driving, potentially leading to acci-
dents that could otherwise be avoided. 
Third, incentivizing drivers to intervene may make autonomous ve-
hicles less safe. For example, autonomous vehicles may be able to follow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 70. Thrun, supra note 3. 
 71 . See Torie Bosch, Watch a Blind Man Take Google’s Self-Driving Car for a Spin, 
SLATE.COM, (Mar. 29, 2012, 12:14 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/03/29/ 
google_s_self_driving_car_takes_a_blind_man_to_taco_bell_video_.html. 
 72. NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.165 (2011). 
 73. Jeff Wise, What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447, POPULAR MECHANICS (Dec. 6, 
2011), http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/crashes/what-really-happened-
aboard-air-france-447-6611877. 
 74. Id. 
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closer than a human driver to a vehicle ahead of it on the highway, and 
thus be more efficient, due to the vehicle’s much-faster reaction time to a 
stoppage ahead. Incentivizing a driver to intervene in some situations 
may place the driver in a situation that the autonomous vehicle has the 
ability to navigate safely, but the driver does not. 
The duty of care that a driver of an autonomous vehicle in automat-
ic mode should owe to other drivers and passengers is beyond the scope 
of this Comment. Because many of the benefits of autonomous vehicles 
may only be realized if that the driver’s duty of care owed to others on 
the road is lowered, and because lowering a driver’s duty while the vehi-
cle is in automatic operation may actually lead to safer vehicles, this 
Comment assumes that the driver’s potential liability is reduced while 
the vehicle is in automatic mode to the point where a driver is not incen-
tivized to intervene in an emergency. 
Absence of Liability-Apportioning Legislation. We next assume 
that rules regarding apportioning liability between drivers and autono-
mous vehicle manufacturers are not set out by statute or regulation. A 
statute can override the duty of care owed by an entity, including a com-
mon or private carrier.75 Nevada’s statute authorizes the Nevada Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles to “adopt regulations authorizing the operation 
of autonomous vehicles” on Nevada highways, and requires that those 
regulations set forth minimum mechanical requirements, insurance re-
quirements, safety standards, testing, geographical restrictions, and “such 
other requirements as the Department determines to be necessary.”76 
Therefore, it remains to be seen whether Nevada will set forth statutory 
standards apportioning liability between autonomous vehicle manufac-
turers and drivers, but the Department is not required to do so before au-
tonomous vehicles become legal on Nevada highways. This Comment 
assumes that the question of liability for an accident involving an auton-
omous vehicle could come before a court as a matter of first impression 
with no statutory direction.77 
Manufacturers are Analogous to Operators. Finally, we assume that 
a manufacturer of an autonomous vehicle is analogous to an operator of 
the vehicle. The law of common carriers is designed around holding the 
operator (or owner) of the carrier liable. With autonomous vehicles, there 
is no human “operator,” and the owner of the vehicle would likely be a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 75. See, e.g., De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transp. Co., 225 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986). 
 76. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.100 (2011). 
 77. While this Comment is intended to help courts interpret the complexities presented by 
autonomous vehicle liability, the principles discussed in this Comment could also be instructive for 
regulators pondering the same question. 
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private party (oftentimes, the driver). However, the manufacturer of the 
autonomous vehicle, like a carrier operation, will have exclusive control 
over the capabilities and limitations of the mode of transportation—the 
autonomous technology. 
Obviously there are some problems with this assumption. Primarily, 
the manufacturer of the autonomous vehicle, unlike the operator or own-
er of a common carrier, will likely have little control of the vehicle after 
a sale, and is thus not in a position to ensure that the owner properly 
maintains the vehicle. However, the manufacturer, like an operator of a 
carrier, will have exclusive control over the capabilities and limitations 
of the technology, the decision-making processes of the vehicle, and the 
designed safety margins. Thus, even though the analogy is imperfect, we 
equate manufacturers of autonomous vehicles to the operators of carriers 
to determine whether the heightened duty of care owed by common car-
riers is applicable to those manufacturers. 
C. Liability of Common Carriers 
In order to understand the implications of comparing autonomous 
vehicles with common carriers of passengers, we must first analyze the 
duty to which the law holds such entities. Generally, common carriers78 
are held strictly liable for any injury to goods, but are held to owe pas-
sengers the highest standard of care, bound to “extraordinary diligence. . 
. to protect the lives and persons of his passengers.”79 This heightened 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 78. A “common carrier” is “one whose business, occupation or regular calling it is to carry 
chattels for all persons who may choose to employ him and remunerate him.” Central of Georgia Ry. 
Co. v. Lippman, 110 Ga. 665 (1900). Alternatively, a “common carrier of passengers” is one who 
“undertake[s] for hire to carry all persons indifferently who may apply for passage, so long as there 
is room, and there is no legal excuse for refusing.” Id. 
 79. Id. Although it at first seems odd that a common carrier of goods is held to a higher stand-
ard (strict liability) than a common carrier of passengers, the Supreme Court of Georgia justified 
such incongruence thusly: 
[S]trange as it may seem, both at common law and under our statute, the responsibility of 
a passenger carrier for the lives and persons of his passengers is less in degree than a 
common carrier in the transportation of goods. The former is bound only to extraordinary 
diligence; the latter, not only to extraordinary diligence, but, if the goods are injured or 
destroyed, no excuse avails him, unless such injury or destruction was occasioned by the 
act of God or the public enemies of the state. The reasons are obvious: A box of goods 
remains where it is placed; a man has locomotion and a will. When a carrier receives the 
first, he has absolute control; while his control of the passenger is limited to the promul-
gation of rules, which may or may not be observed. 
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has used similar rationale in holding that common carriers were not 
strictly liable when transporting slaves, but instead should be held to a lesser, but still high, standard 
of care: 
“The law regulating the responsibility of common carriers, does not apply to the case of 
carrying intelligent beings. . . . The carrier has not, and cannot have over them the same 
absolute control that he has over inanimate matter. In the nature of things, and in their 
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standard of care is the highest degree of care, vigilance, and precaution 
for the passengers’ safety consistent with the nature of the conveyance 
and its proper and normal operation.80 The liability of a carrier of pas-
sengers “is not that of an insurer, but such carrier is bound by law to ex-
traordinary diligence to protect the lives and persons of his passengers.” 
81 The United States Supreme Court has said that passengers are owed 
the duty of utmost care and diligence and that passenger carriers are “an-
swerable for the smallest negligence.”82 This standard of care is often 
established by statute,83 but derives from the common law, based in the 
theory that there exists a “special relationship” between the carrier and 
the passenger.84 Under this heightened duty of care, a common carrier of 
passengers is liable for injuries to passengers resulting from even the 
slightest negligence.85 This heightened duty is justified in part because 
passengers have little control over the operation of the transport, the ac-
tions of the carriers’ employees, the conduct of the business, or their own 
safety.86 
Alternatively, private carriers are held to a normal negligence 
standard.87 Private carriers are entities that provide transportation ser-
vices, but who do not serve the public indiscriminately—they only pro-
vide transportation to passengers pursuant to a special agreement or un-
derstanding, in a particular instance, and only to a previously agreed des-
tination.88 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
character, they resemble passengers, and not packages of goods. It would seem reasona-
ble therefore, that the responsibility of the carrier should be measured by the law which is 
applicable to passengers, rather than by that which is applicable to the carriage of com-
mon goods.” 
Boyce v. Anderson, 27 U.S. 150, 154 (1829). 
 80. Mitchell v. New York, L.E. & W.R. Co., 146 U.S. 513 (1892). See also W. Page Keeton et 
al., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 209 (5th ed. 1984) (“Common Carriers, who 
enter into an understanding toward the public for the benefit of all those who wish to make use of 
their services, must use great caution to protect passengers entrusted to their care. . . .”). 
 81. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Lippman, 110 Ga. 665 (1900). 
 82. Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U.S. 181 (1839). 
 83. See, e.g., California Civil Code § 2100 (setting out a duty of “utmost care and diligence” 
owed by common carriers to passengers). 
 84. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357 (1873). 
 85. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451 (1880); Lewis v. City Of Shreveport, 985 So. 2d 
1249 (La. Ct. App. 2008), writ denied, 992 So. 2d 1018 (La. 2008). Some have even argued that 
strict liability should be applied to common carriers, since passive passengers play no role in the 
decision-making that leads to an accident involving a carrier. Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving 
Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REV. 677 (1985). 
 86. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Ultimate Livery Serv., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 2008). 
 87. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Ultimate Livery Serv., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 2008). 
 88. Doe v. Rockdale School Dist., No. 84, 287 Ill. App. 3d 791 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Browne v. 
SCR Medical Transp. Servs., Inc., 356 Ill. App. 3d 642 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Hostettler v. Cmty. Care 
Ambulance, No. 2004-A-0001, 2004 WL 2697376 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2004). 
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D. Autonomous Vehicle Manufacturers Should Be Held to Owe the Same 
Duty of Care as Common Carriers 
1. Autonomous Vehicle Manufacturers Are Similar to Common Carriers 
of Passengers 
Although autonomous vehicle manufacturers do not fit the standard 
definition of a common carrier of passengers, most of the factors courts 
assess to determine if an entity is a common carrier of passengers are 
likewise applicable to autonomous vehicle manufacturers. A passenger 
carrier is an entity that undertakes, as its primary function, to transport 
persons from place to place.89 A common carrier of passengers indis-
criminately serves all persons who apply, holds itself out as ready and 
willing to serve indifferently, and offers service to all who choose to em-
ploy the carrier and pay the applicable charges.90 Even assuming (as we 
are) that an autonomous vehicle manufacturer is analogous to a carrier 
operator, the manufacturer would not be holding itself out as open to the 
public; only those who purchased the autonomous vehicles would have 
the right to ride in them, and no passengers would be under the illusion 
that they are being transported by the manufacturer itself. 
Further, the entity must first have been acting as a common carrier 
within the meaning of the applicable state law for common carrier liabil-
ity to apply.91 The common-law classification of a carrier as a common 
carrier, rather than a definition in a regulatory scheme, dictates the appli-
cable standard of care in a negligence case.92 As way of example, courts 
have held that railroads, 93  streetcars, 94  buses, 95  taxicabs, 96  airlines, 97 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 89. Mitchell v. New York Life Ins. Co, 75 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1934). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Simon v. Walt Disney World Co., 114 Cal. App. 4th 1162 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 92. Hunt ex rel. Gende v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Serv., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 904 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2004) (involving common carrier of passengers). 
 93. Crane v. Railway Express Agency, 12 N.E.2d 672 (Ill. Ct. App. 1938), judgment modified 
on other grounds, 15 N.E.2d 866 (1938). 
 94. North Chicago Elec. Ry. Co. v. Peuser, 190 Ill. 67 (1901); In re Curtailment of Bus Serv., 
252 N.W. 407 (Neb. 1934). 
 95. Dresser v. City of Wichita, 96 Kan. 820 (1915); Brown v. Homer-Doyline Bus Lines, 23 
So. 2d 348 (La. Ct. App. 1945); Hinds v. Steere, 209 Mass. 442 (1911); Kloran v. Drogin, 99 N.J.L. 
422 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1924); Public Serv. Commission, Second Dist., v. Booth, 170 A.D. 590 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1915); City of Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83 (1915); Riggsby v. Tritton, 143 Va. 
903 (1925); Cushing v. White, 101 Wash. 172 (1918). 
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amusement rides,98 ski lift operators,99 and elevators100 are all common 
carriers. 
Yet, when we look at the factors courts have used to determine 
whether an entity is a common carrier, the picture becomes more com-
plex. Many of the factors courts have used to determine whether an enti-
ty is a common carrier of passengers, or a common carrier in general, are 
applicable to autonomous vehicle manufacturers. 
First, to determine whether an entity is a common carrier (of pas-
sengers or things), courts have held that the method of operation, not the 
representations of the company, are most relevant.101 Thus, just because 
autonomous vehicles are not common carriers under our previously un-
derstood characterizations, it is not dispositive that their manufacturers 
do not identify themselves as common carriers. 
Second, courts look to an entity’s primary function and to whether 
that function is public transportation or whether transportation is only 
incidental the entity’s primary business.102 Autonomous vehicle manu-
facturers are not engaged in public transportation services. But it cannot 
be said that “transportation” is only incidental to their primary purpose. 
Unlike a manufacturer of a traditional (manually operated) vehicle, au-
tonomous vehicle manufacturers will be selling, in a significant part, a 
product that engages in transportation services, requiring minimal inter-
action from the driver. That there is no human driver may be irrelevant—
would there be any dispute that a vehicle manufacturer engages in 
“transportation” if it provided a human driver, paid for by the manufac-
turer, with every vehicle it delivered? While the “human driver” hypo-
thetical is limited (for instance, the autonomous vehicle does not remain 
an agent of the manufacturer), it can be instructive, and suggests that, in 
a way, the autonomous vehicle is engaged in “transportation,” a factor 
that suggests an entity is a common carrier. 
Third, an entity is more likely to be found to be a common carrier if 
it serves the public indiscriminately and does not make individualized 
decisions as to whether and on what terms it transports persons or prop-
erty.103 Again, this factor is murky when applied to autonomous vehicles. 
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Autonomous vehicles, when owned by a private party, would not be 
serving the public indiscriminately. But autonomous vehicle manufactur-
ers, unlike private carriers, cannot make individualized determinations as 
to whom they decide to carry, when to carry them, and to where they will 
be delivered. Similar to a common carrier, which casts its net of respon-
sibility out to the general public by providing transportation service in-
discriminately, an autonomous vehicle manufacturer has little or no con-
trol over who ultimately becomes a passenger. This uncertainty, shared 
by both common carriers and autonomous vehicle manufacturers, is one 
justification for holding common carriers to a higher duty of care.104 
Fourth, an autonomous vehicle manufacturer does not solicit pas-
sengers for transportation from the public. An entity that solicits patron-
age from the public but reserves the right to accept or reject the offered 
business arbitrarily or on an individualized basis is not a common carri-
er.105 But the manufacturer does not have the power to reject passengers 
on an individual basis once the vehicle is sold. Control over who rides in 
the vehicle, and thus which persons are potentially relying on the auton-
omous vehicle’s safe operation, will rest solely with the owner of the 
vehicle. This indiscriminate (from the manufacturer’s perspective) pas-
senger population is a hallmark of common carriers. 
Fifth, autonomous vehicle manufacturers do not fit within the defi-
nition of private carriers. Private carriers are entities that do provide 
transportation services, but do not hold themselves out as open to serving 
the public indiscriminately.106 Private carriers are not held to the same 
high duty of care as public (common) carriers are, because they have full 
control over the terms of the service offered: who they transport, when 
they provide the transportation, and to what destinations.107 As discussed 
above, autonomous vehicle manufacturers retain none of these limiting 
factors. 
Autonomous vehicle manufacturers do not fit into most traditional 
definitions of common carriers. They do not hold themselves out as a 
publicly available mode of transportation, their primary purpose is not to 
provide public transportation, and the vehicles will not be serving the 
public indiscriminately. Autonomous vehicle manufacturers, however, 
do fit some of the factors courts use to determine whether an entity is a 
common carrier. They have exclusive control over the vehicle’s opera-
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tion, but little control over the terms of conveyance (who, what, when, 
and where). 
2. Autonomous Vehicle Manufacturers Are Similar to Common  
Passenger Carriers 
 
Additionally, factors that courts have used to assess whether an en-
tity is a common carrier of passengers suggests that autonomous vehicle 
manufacturers are analogous to such carriers. 
Again, the general characteristics of common carriers of passengers 
do not explicitly apply to autonomous vehicle manufacturers. The com-
panies would not be holding themselves out to the public as a service for 
hire like traditional common passenger carriers. However, the other two 
factors implicate a consideration of autonomous vehicle manufacturers as 
common carriers of passengers: (1) whether the operator controls the 
manner of transportation; and (2) whether the passenger places himself 
or herself in the operator’s care.108 
At minimum, the manufacturer of an autonomous vehicle would 
have control over the software and hardware that controls the vehicle 
while in automatic mode. The owner of the vehicle, while likely respon-
sible for the maintenance and general upkeep of the vehicle, will not be 
expected (or perhaps even able) to maintain the software and hardware 
related to the autonomic operation of the vehicle. The algorithms that 
dictate which lane the vehicle is in, how much space to leave before the 
car ahead, and at what speed to navigate a particular on- or off-ramp will 
be in complete control of the manufacturer. In that sense, control of the 
manner of transportation will be entirely within the control of the manu-
facturer. 
Additionally, passengers of autonomous vehicles will be placing 
their faith in those algorithms and the accompanying cameras, lasers, and 
satellite positioning systems—in other words, they will be placing them-
selves in the care of the manufacturers that design those systems. 
Although autonomous vehicle manufacturers do not fall within the 
traditional definition of common carriers, they are characterized by many 
of the same traits as common carriers. We next look to the public policy 
behind holding common carriers of passengers to owe the highest duty of 
care to determine whether autonomous vehicle manufacturers should be 
held to a similarly high standard. 
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D. Policy Justifications for Holding Autonomous Vehicle Manufacturers 
to the Same High Duty of Care as Common Carriers of Passengers 
As discussed above, autonomous vehicle manufacturers are not 
common carriers of passengers, primarily because they will not be hold-
ing themselves out as open to the public. However, we have also dis-
cussed how many of the factors relevant to whether an entity is a com-
mon carrier can be applied to manufacturers of autonomous vehicles. 
The similarities between common passenger carriers and autonomous 
vehicle manufacturers suggest that many of the policy reasons behind 
holding common carriers of passengers to a higher duty of care are appli-
cable to autonomous vehicle manufacturers. We next discuss why the 
justifications for holding common passenger carriers to a higher duty of 
care apply similarly to autonomous vehicle manufacturers, and thus, why 
they should be held to the same high standard of care even though they 
do not fit the traditional definition of common carriers. 
Courts have held that the obligation of a common carrier arises out 
of considerations of public policy, independent of contract, either express 
or implied.109 This is because the justifications for holding common car-
riers of passengers to a high standard of care exist regardless of the na-
ture of the relationship between the parties.110 
Common passenger carriers are held to a high standard of care be-
cause passengers have little control over the means of conveyance.111 In 
Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Lawson, the 7th Circuit held 
that a street car operator owed a heightened duty of care to its passengers 
when it took, for free, a group of conference attendees on a tour of Indi-
anapolis, even though the trial court had held that the streetcar operator 
was a private carrier for purposes of the free tour.112 The court comment-
ed that the basis for the heightened duty was not affected by the fact that 
the passengers were not paying customers, but that the heightened duty 
arose from considerations of public policy.113 The justification behind the 
rule, the court said, was that passengers turn over control of their own 
safety and rely on the carrier for their safe delivery:114 
All the [passengers] did, or could do, was to direct when to go and 
where to go; the very important how to go was necessarily left to the 
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motormen and conductors. All the skill and experience were with 
the company, all the inexperience with the [passengers]. . . . The 
company was charged with the custody and care of human lives in a 
service voluntarily assumed, and it is of no importance whether it 
was in the technical relation of common carrier or not.115 
Similarly, passengers in an autonomous vehicle will be able to direct the 
car when to go and where to go, but will have no control over “the very 
important how to go.”116 The skill and expertise that will impact the safe-
ty of the voyage, instead of residing with the operator of the public carri-
er, will be in the hands of the programmers, engineers, and manufactur-
ers that dictate the autonomous vehicle’s capabilities and limitations. 
Another justification for holding common passenger carriers to a 
higher standard is that passengers cannot use their own faculties for pro-
tecting themselves.117 In addition to relinquishing the “how” aspect of the 
transportation, passengers in autonomous vehicles will be relinquishing 
their normal abilities to protect themselves. With autonomous vehicles, 
unlike a typical passenger carrier, the passenger-driver could intervene 
and take control of the vehicle in emergency situations. As discussed 
above, however, it may be advantageous (or even necessary) to incentiv-
ize the driver of an autonomous vehicle to not intervene (by reducing the 
driver’s level of responsibility for the vehicle while in automatic mode). 
For example, a driver who is passively being transported by an autono-
mous vehicle will not likely be paying as close attention to the driving 
situation as if she were in manual control of the vehicle. Even if the driv-
er is not engaged in some other task, the driver is unlikely to be fully en-
gaged in their surroundings (such as monitoring his blind spots). Incen-
tivizing a driver to intervene in a perceived emergency could lead to a 
more dangerous situation if the driver responds without full comprehen-
sion of his surroundings. While a driver of an autonomous vehicle may 
be able to reestablish manual control with the push of a button, it may 
not be wise to require her to do so. Thus, like a passenger of a common 
carrier, the driver of an autonomous vehicle may have a reduced ability 
to intervene and avoid accidents. This factor is a justification for holding 
common carriers of passengers to a higher standard of care, and is appli-
cable to autonomous vehicles as well. 
Finally, another basis of the heightened duty is found in the inher-
ent regard the law has for human life and personal safety.118 Similar to 
passenger carriers, the functionality of autonomous vehicle technology 
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will be protecting or risking both the lives of passengers and the lives 
and safety of others navigating the same highways. 
Because the public policies behind holding common carriers of pas-
sengers to the highest standard of care are similarly applicable to auton-
omous vehicle manufacturers, those manufacturers should be held to that 
same high standard. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Autonomous vehicles, cars that can drive themselves with limited 
or no human interaction, are currently under development. The impend-
ing proliferation of this technology will present unanswered legal ques-
tions. Primarily, and the question this Comment answers, is the question 
of how liability will be assessed when an autonomous vehicle is in an 
accident while under automatic operation. 
For the reasons set forth above, autonomous vehicle liability should 
be assessed under the traditional products liability scheme. However, 
because autonomous vehicles share many traits with common carriers, 
and common carriers owe the highest duty of care to their passengers, 
autonomous vehicle manufacturers should be held to the same standard. 
This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that many of the policy 
justifications for holding common carriers of passengers to the highest 
standard are applicable to autonomous vehicle manufactures. 
Autonomous vehicle technology presents the most significant 
transportation transformation in recent time. The full benefits of the 
technology, however, can only be achieved if the law adopts an approach 
to apportioning liability that holds manufacturers to a high standard, but 
also allows the technology to flourish. Holding autonomous vehicle 
manufacturers to the same high standard that common passenger carriers 
are held will achieve this goal. 
Hopefully, soon we will all have access to safe, autonomous trans-
portation. Because didn’t we all grow up wanting to be Michael 
Knight?119 
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